Significant Flaws
When one reads through all the data that Bibby references, there is some merit to the polarization thesis. Depending on the measurement in question, many Canadians do gravitate to the extreme ends of the polarization continuum. However, two significant flaws are readily apparent with the polarization thesis. First, on several measurements that Bibby uses to build his case, upwards of 50% of those sampled fall somewhere between the extremes. This healthy representation of Canadians in the middle is problematic for an argument that suggests Canadians tend to fall on either end of the polarization continuum. Second, and undoubtedly the greatest flaw of this book, is that it fails to consider an alternative, and arguably more plausible, interpretation of the data: secularization. Without exception, Bibby’s longitudinal measurements on church attendance, religious affiliation, and belief in God or a supernatural being point to decreases on the “religious” end of the continuum and increases on the “non-religious” end of the spectrum. Canadian teens and adults are attending religious services less today, more individuals are never attending services, increasing percentages of Canadians claim to have “no religion,” fewer individuals “definitely” believe in God or a supernatural being, and more individuals “definitely do not” believe in God or a supernatural being. The polarization interpretation is a welcome change from Bibby’s earlier revitalization rhetoric. However, he still glosses over this seemingly obvious and overarching trend of secularization in Canada.
Despite these flaws, Bibby offers a variety of helpful insights about social life in a religiously polarized context. In chapter four he discusses the tensions that arise when fundamentalists of different sorts (the extremely religious or irreligious) collide in a diverse and conventionally tolerant Canada. Bibby shows that Canadians on the extremes really do view the world differently, on topics ranging from organized religion’s impact on Canada or the world, to what clergy should or should not address in their sermons, to confidence in religious leaders and religious organizations, to views about homosexuality. An interesting and telling finding is that 31% of all Canadians (including 50% of the non-religious) claim that they would feel uneasy around a born-again Christian (18% responded this way toward Muslims). Though Bibby does not explicitly say so, this finding is likely a function of our geographical proximity to the strong (and negative, in the minds of some Canadians) evangelical presence in the United States and the American media that Canadians are constantly exposed to.
Similar to many sociologists of religion in recent years, Bibby takes some time to address the impact that religious beliefs and practices, or the lack thereof, has on individuals and society as a whole. In terms of personal well-being (chapter five), he demonstrates that one’s level of happiness – as measured in areas such as marital or relationship satisfaction, quality of life, or self-esteem – is virtually the same between the highly religious and irreligious. Though the sources of their happiness may vary (and religion is the source for some), most Canadians are quite happy. At the level of social well-being (chapter seven), religiosity does appear to make a difference. When compared with those who are not religious, Canadians adults and teens who are very religious tend to place greater importance on social values such as concern for others, forgiveness, and generosity are less likely to have been in trouble with the police, to be involved with drugs or bullying. Bibby states, “Religion is one important source of positive interpersonal life. Those who are not religious do not lack for civility and compassion. But, collectively, they tend to lag slightly behind Canadians who are religious” (p. 153). He goes on to conclude, “If religion ceases to be practiced by significant numbers of Canadians, some equally effective sources of social wellbeing will have to be found” (p. 160). Given these broader social implications, even the generalist in sociology who has no interest in studying religion per se may have an interest in this book.
In chapter eight, Bibby charts Canadian responses to death. Overall, belief in life after death remains stable since 1985, including the 50% to 60% of Canadian teens and adults who continue to neither wholeheartedly embrace nor reject the possibility of life after death. As expected, the very religious are more prone to “definitely” believe in life after death, while the irreligious are more likely to say that they “definitely do not” believe in the afterlife. In addition, one-third of Canadians, regardless of religiosity level, are ambivalent about what happens after life on earth, while many actively religious people are confident that there will be some type of rewards and punishments in the afterlife. When asked about their primary emotional response to death, religious people, particularlyconservative Protestants, respond with a sense of hope, whereas most others respond with sorrow, mystery, or fear. In light of these findings, Bibby concludes by saying, “The market for answers to the ongoing, universal question of what happens after we die remains extremely vast . . . the desire for increasing clarity on this critical issue is something most of us want. That widespread desire guarantees a permanent place for religion” (pp. 184– 185).